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NOTES
PARENTAL NOTICE STATUTES:
PERMISSIBLE STATE REGULATION OF
A MINOR'S ABORTION DECISION
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade 1 established that a woman's
right to procure an abortion free from certain state interference 2 is a
fundamental constitutional right,3 emanating from the right of pri-
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 153. Roe v. Wade and its progeny have spawned extensive scholarly
commentary on the issue of abortion. See J. Noonan, A Private Choice: Abortion in
America in the Seventies 5-32 (1979); Bvrn, An American Tragedy. The Supreme
Court on Abortion, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 807 (1973); El)', The Wages of Crjing 1,olf,
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due
Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 159; Heymann
& Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. Rev.
765 (1973); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical
Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 689 (1976); Regan, Re-
writing Roe v. Wade. 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569 (1979); Tribe, The Supreme Court,
1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life, and
Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1973); Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantice Due Process and
the Right of Abortion, 25 Hastings L.J. 867 (1974); Note, Implications of the Abor-
tion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 237
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Implications]; Note, Roe! Doe! Where are You?: The Ef-
fect of the Supreme Court's Abortion Decisions, 7 U. Cal. D.L. Rev. 432 (1974);
Comment, The Culmination of the Abortion Reform Mocenent-Roe v. Wade and
Doe v. Bolton, 8 U. Rich. L. Rev. 75 (1973); Note, Roe v. Wade arid Doe v. Bolton:
The Compelling State Interest Test in Substantive Due Process. 30 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 628 (1973); 12 J. Faro. L. 459 (1972-73); 51 N.C.L. Rev. 1573 (1973); 27 U.
Miami L. Rev. 481 (1973). These articles either praise or deride Roe v. Wade's place
as a landmark in constitutional law. For a review of pre-Roe v. Wade abortion case
law, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973); Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the
Lesson of the Pre-Roe Case Law, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (1979).
3. 410 U.S. at 153-55; see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). A right is funda-
mental when the Constitution, explicitly or implicitly, guarantees the right. San An-
tonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973); Colyar v.
Third Judicial Dist. Ct., 469 F. Supp. 424, 430 (D. Utah 1979). Various implicit
fundamental rights are protected including privacy rights. Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693-95 (1977) (right of minors to contraceptives). Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976) (right to abort %vithout third party con-
sent); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-55 (1973) (right to abort); Griswold v. Connec-
ticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (right to use contraceptives); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate). Other implicit fundamental rights in-
clude the right to travel, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969); the right to vote, Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134, 140-44 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968); and the right to marry.
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vacy.4 Despite language in Roe v. Wade to the contrary, 5 however,
various state interests may justify regulation of this right even in the
first trimester of pregnancy. 6 In response to the new parameters de-
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967). Various implicit rights are not fundamental. See, e.g., San Antonio Indepen-
dent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 54 (1973) (right to education); Mas-
sachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (right to gov-
ernment employment); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1970) (right to
receive welfare).
4. 410 U.S. at 152-53; see, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
685 (1977) (an overview of privacy rights); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (contraceptives); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (possession of
obscene material); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (contracep-
tives); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate). Privacy
rights were not always constitutionally protected. The constitutional right to privacy
was first discussed and rejected in a fourth amendment context. See Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Bill of Rights
includes the right of privacy), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53
(1967). Justice Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent argued that an individual had "the
right to be let alone." 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Griswold v. Connec-
ticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), provided privacy with constitutional status and suggested
its source was a penumbra emanating from the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484. Others have
argued that the right of privacy is derived from other sources. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (fourteenth amendment liberty interest); Griswold v. Connec-
ticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (ninth amendment). See
generally Miller, The Privacy Revolution: A Report from the Barricades, 19
Washburn L.J. 1 (1979). Roe v. Wade and its successors, by protecting an implicit
right, have given new vitality to the doctrine of substantive due process. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-69 (Stewart, J., concurring); Developments in the Law-
The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1162, 1167-68 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Developments].
5. 410 U.S. at 163-64. "For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical
judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician." Id. at 164. This language
seems to create an absolute right to effectuate a first trimester abortion. See Friend-
ship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1150 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); Mobile Women's Medical Clinic, Inc. v.
Board of Comm'rs, 426 F. Supp. 331, 335 (S.D. Ala. 1977). Moreover, Roe v. Wade
allowed regulation of abortion after the first trimester "except where it is necessary,
in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother." 410 U.S. at 165. One commentator read this language as.granting the right
to obtain an abortion on demand at any point during the pregnancy. J. Noonan,
supra note 2, at 10-12.
6. The Roe v. Wade language that apparently forbids state regulation of first
trimester abortions, see note 5 supra, has not been read literally. Sendak v. Arnold,
429 U.S. 968, 970, 972 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (implicit rejection of a literal
reading). Cases have recognized that- some first trimester regulation is permissible.
See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (Bellotti II) (judicial consent);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67, 79-81 (1976) (woman's informed
consent, recordkeeping); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975) (per curiam)
(requirement that only licensed physicians perform abortions); Bossier City Medical
Suite, Inc. v. City of Bossier City, 483 F. Supp. 633, 650 (W.D. La. 1980) (reason-
[Vol. 49
PARENTAL NOTICE STATUTES
lineated in Roe v. Wade, 7 states have enacted numerous statutes reg-
ulating a woman's exercise of her abortion right. 8
Parental notice statutes, 9 one form of state regulation, require prior
notification to the parent(s) or guardian(s) of an unmarried, uneman-
able zoning ordinances); West Side Women's Servs., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 450 F.
Supp. 796, 798 (N.D. Ohio) (same), affd menn., 582 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978). See generally Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529,
537 (S.D. Fla. 1979). This Note, in discussing parental notice statutes, focuses on the
stricter constitutional standard for state regulation of first trimester abortions. Stat-
utes requiring notice only for second and third trimester abortions would almost
certainly be upheld. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (review-
ing acceptable state regulation during each trimester); Note, Due Process and Equal
Protection: Constitutional Implications of Abortion Notice and Reporting Require-
ments, 56 B.U.L. Rev. 522 (1976) (same) [hereinafter cited as Notice and Reporting].
7. The two most prominent state interests justifying state regulation set forth in
Roe v. Wade are protection of both the pregnant woman's health and "the potential-
ity of human life." 410 U.S. at 154, 162. State regulation that protects maternal
health or potential life has been upheld. Maternal health is protected by statutes
requiring that only physicians perform abortions, Connecticut v. Menillo, 42.3 U.S. 9.
11 (1975) (per curiam); recordkeeping, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
79-81 (1976); Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F.
Supp. 1172, 1205 (N.D. Ohio 1979); and pathology reporting. Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-700 (W.D. Mo. 1980). The potential life
represented by the fetus is protected by state statutes restricting the abortion right
after the fetus has become viable. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
63-65 (1976) (acceptable definition of viability).
8. For a review of state regulation of abortion after Roe v. Wade and a discus-
sion of its constitutionality, see Bryant, State Legislation on Abortion after Roe v.
Wade: Selected Constitutional Issues, 2 Am. J.L. & Med. 101, 102-03, 130 (1976);
Notice and Reporting, supra note 6; Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations
on State Action after Danforth and Carey, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1216, 1224 (197)
[hereinafter cited as Minor's Right of Privacy]; Implications, supra note 2. at 245-47;
Note, Abortion Statutes After Danforth: An Examination, 15 J. Fan. L. 537, 537,
556-58, 561-62, 564-66 (1976-77) [hereinafter cited as Statutes After Danforth].
9. Ten states currently have parental notice statutes. I1l. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §
81-54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981) (held unconstitutional in Wynn v. Care%., 582
F.2d 1375, 1388-90 (7th Cir. 1978)); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35, 35.5 (West
Supp. 1980) (held unconstitutional in Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 205
(E.D. La. 1980)); Me. Rev. Stat. Anti. tit. 22, § 1597 (1980) (preliminarily enjoined in
Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 547-48 (D.
Me. 1979)); Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 135(d) (1980); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 188.028 (Ver-
non Supp. 1980) (held unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483
F. Supp. 679, 697 (W.D. Mo. 1980)); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-5-616 (Spec.
Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-333 (Supp. 1979) (held unconstitutional in Womens
Servs. v. Thone, No. CV78-L-289, slip op. at 2-3 (D. Neb. Aug. 1. 1979)); N.D.
Cent. Code § 14-02.1-03 (Interim Supp. 1979) (preliminarily enjoined in Leigh v.
Olson, No. A3-79-78, slip op. at 5 (D.N.D. July 9, 1979)); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-30"2
(Supp. 1979); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304 (1978). Certain municipalities also have
enacted local regulations designed to regulate abortions. Akron, Ohio, for example,
has an ordinance, No. 160-1978, § 1870.05(A) (Feb. 28, 1978), containing a parental
notice requirement which was invalidated in Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
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cipated minor who desires an abortion. 10 This notice typically must
be provided before the abortion 11 by the minor's physician1 2 and is
Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1202, 1208-13 (N.D. Ohio 1979). Niagara
County, New York also had a parental notice ordinance which was overturned by a
federal district court on state preemption grounds. Susan B. v. Clifford, No. 78-823,
slip op. at 9-10 (W.D.N.Y. May 23, 1979), aff'd mere., 610 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1836 (1980); see N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1980, § B, at 22, col.
6 (Westchester County, N.Y., Ordinance vetoed by County Executive); id., Sept. 9,
1980, § B, at 2, col. 1 (Westchester County Ordinance passed). Other states have
considered, but ultimately rejected, parental notice legislation. See N.Y. Times, Dec.
13, 1979, § B, at 7, col. 6; id., Dec. 11, 1979, § 13, at 11, col. 3 (New Jersey)
(governor's veto); Governor's Commission to Review the New York Abortion Law,
Final Report 4-5, 7 (1977) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (New York) (gov-
ernor's committee recommended against adoption). A Model Parental Notice Statute
is set out in the Appendix. For another proposed model parental notice statute which
arguably withstands constitutional scrutiny, see Note, Parent, Child, and the Deci-
sion to Abort: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Statutory Proposal in Bellotti v.
Baird, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1869, 1907-08 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Parent, Child).
These parental notice provisions apply regardless of the stage of the minor's preg-
nancy.
10. Eleven million of the 21,000,000 people between the ages of 15-19 (over 52%)
have had sexual intercourse. Alan Guttmacher Inst., 11 Million Teenagers 9 (1976).
Each year over 1,030,000 adolescent females (about 10%)'become pregnant. Approx-
imately 30,000 are under the age of fifteen, and two-thirds (about 680,000) are un-
married. Godenne, Pregnancy in Unwed Adolescents, in Psychological Aspects of
Gynecology and Obstetrics 109 (B. Wolman ed. 1978). According to statistics coin-
piled by the Alan Guttmacher Institute, more than 400,000 abortions were performed
on United States teenagers in 1978. Kent, Teenage Sexuality and Adolescent Preg-
nancy, in The Safety of Fertility Control 284-85 (L. Keith ed. 1980). In 1974, of the
women who had legal abortions one-third were 25 years of age or older, one-third
were 20-24 years of age, and one-third were teenagers. Center for Disease Control,
U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Abortion Surveillance 1974, at 2 (1976).
See generally Kent, supra, at 283-88. These statistics do not distinguish btveen
married and unmarried women, and thus reflect a larger number of minors undergo-
ing abortion than would be affected by parental notice statutes, which apply only to
unmarried minors.
11. Most parental notice statutes do not set an explicit time that must elapse
between notice and the abortion. II. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 81-54 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1980-1981) (held unconstitutional in Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1388-90 (7th
Cir. 1978)); Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 135(d) (1980); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 188.028 (Ver-
non Supp. 1980) (held unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483
F. Supp. 679, 697 (W.D. Mo. 1980)); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-5-616 (Spec.
Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-333 (Supp. 1979) (held unconstitutional in Womens
Servs. v. Thone, No. CV78-L-289, slip op. at 2-3 (D. Neb. Aug. 1, 1979)); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-7-304 (1978). Other provisions require a short time to elapse. La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.5 (West Supp. 1980) (24 hours actual notice or 72 hours
constructive notice) (held unconstitutional in Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp.
181, 205 (E.D. La. 1980)); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1597 (1980) (24 hours)
(preliminarily enjoined in Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477
F. Supp. 542, 547-48 (D. Me. 1979)); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1-03 (Interim Supp.
1979) (24 hours); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-302 (Supp. 1979) (two days); Akron, Ohio Ordi-
nance N-o. 160-1978 § 1870-05(A) (Feb. 28, 1978) (24 hours) (held unconstitutional in
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172,
1202 (N.D. Ohio 1979)). A provision requiring 24 hours notice when possible, as
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intended to insure informed consent and encourage parental consulta-
tion before the pregnant minor effectuates this important and irrever-
sible decision. 13  Judicial response to these statutes, however, has
varied. Seven parental notice statutes have been held unconstitutional
as unduly restrictive 14 and some for the additional reason of over-
provided in § 1 of the Model Parental Notice Statute in the Appendix, would allow
time for parental consultation and be a minimum time which the minor could extend
if she chose. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304 (1978) (notice "'if possible"). Time is of
the essence in the context of abortion. Delay increases the risk to the pregnant wo-
man's health. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (Bellotti I). Doe ,. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 198-99 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149-50 (1973). Wvnn v.
Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1389 n.29 (7th Cir. 1978). Women's Conmunity lealth
Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 551 (D. Me. 1979). Delay is especially
detrimental in the case of a minor. Jones v. Smith, 474 F. Supp. 1160, 1167 (S.D.
Fla. 1979); see Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 853 (D. Mass. 1975). rer'd on
other grounds, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I) C. Tietze. Induced Abortion: 1979. at
83 (3d ed. 1979). There is precedent that a 24 hour waiting period is permissible.
Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 526 (6th Cir. 1976) (24 hours). Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1204-05 (N.D. Ohio
1979) (24 hours). But see Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 1979) (inl-
validating a 48 hour waiting period); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F.
Supp. 679, 696 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (same); Womens Servs.. P.C. v. Thone. 483 F.
Supp. 1022, 1050 (D. Neb. 1979) (same); Leigh v. Olson. No. A3-79-78, slip op. at 4
(D.N.D. July 9, 1979) (same). Although these cases do not distinguish expressly be-
tween waiting periods of 24 and 48 hours, it is arguable that even the short delay
caused by waiting requirements markedly increases the burden.
12. Of these statutes, see note 9 supra, only Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 135(d)
(1980) allows the doctor to waive notice he believes would result in abuse of the
pregnant minor. The Maryland provision has been implicitly incorporated into § 1(b)
of the Model Parental Notice Statute in the Appendix. Each of the parental notice
statutes requires the physician to notify the minor's parents except Neb. Rev. Stat. §
28-333 (Supp. 1979) (held unconstitutional in Womens Servs. v. Thone, No. CV78-L-
289, slip op. at 2-3 (D. Neb. Aug. 1, 1979)) which requires the minor to sign a
statement of consultation.
13. Parental notice statutes are enacted to protect certain state interests. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-7-304 (1978), for instance, is found in Chapter 7 of the Criminal Code
entitled "Offenses Against the Family," implying that notice statutes protect family
rights. Moreover, the notice requirement is intended "[t]o enable the physician to
exercise his best medical judgment." Id. The Montana notice statute is included in
Part 6 of Chapter 5 of the Criminal Code, "Offenses Against the Family." Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 94-5-616 (Spec. Supp. 1977). I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 81-51 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1980-1981) provides: "It is the intent of the General Assembly of the
State of Illinois that the rights and responsibilities of parents be respected, that the
health and welfare of minors and their unborn children be protected, and that no
minor child who has not married shall be allowed to undergo an abortion operation
without the consultation and consent of her parents, or a court order as part of the
informed consent of the minor child seeking the abortion."
14. Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1390 (7th Cir. 1978) (il. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §
81-54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981)); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181,
203-05 (E.D. La. 1980) (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35 (West Supp. 1980));
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 697 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (,Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 188.039 (Vernon Supp. 1980)); Womens Servs. v. Thone, No. CV78-L-
1980]
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breadth; 15 the Supreme Court of Utah, in H- L- v. Matheson,'"
has upheld a parental notice statute; 17 the merits of three statutes
have not been litigated. 18
This Note analyzes the constitutionality of parental notice statutes.
Three factors enter into this analysis: (1) the nature of the burden 19
on the abortion right; 20 (2) the nature of the state interest pro-
tected; 21 and (3) whether the statute is overbroad. 2 2  Generally, tile
289, slip op. at 2-3 (D. Neb. Aug. 1, 1979) (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-333 (Supp. 1979));
Leigh v. Olson, No. A3-79-78, slip op. at 5 (D.N.D. July 9, 1979) (N.D. Cent. Code
§ 14-02.1-03 (Interim Supp. 1979)); Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v.
Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 546, 548 (D. Me. 1979) 'Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §
1597 (1980)).
15. Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1388-90 (7th Cir. 1978) (Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
38, § 81-54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981)); Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1202 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (Akron, Ohio
Ordinance No. 160-1978 § 1870.05(A) (Feb. 28, 1978)); Women's Community Health
Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 548, 552 (D. Me. 1979) (Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 22, § 1597 (1980)). See generally N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1980, § D, at 19,
col. 1. Some parental notice statutes require more than mere notice, and a finding of
unconstitutionality may result from the additional requirements. See notes 39, 44, 52,
54 infra and accompanying text.
16. 604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1979) (Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304 (1978)), prob. Juris.
noted, 100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980).
17. 604 P.2d at 908. In Matheson, the Supreme Court will decide the merits of a
simple parental notice requirement.
18. Md. Ann. Code art. 43, § 135(d) (1980); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-5-616
(Spec. Supp. 1977); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-302 (Supp. 1979). See generally N.Y.
Times, Feb. 26, 1980, § D, at 19, col. 1.
19. A substantial amount of confusion results from the Court's use of the word
"burden." Sometimes burden refers to the increased difficulty a woman encounters in
exercising her fundamental right because of state regulation. E.g., Bellotti v. Baird,
428 U.S. 132, 147, 151 (1976) (Bellotti I); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 66-67 (1976). Frequently, however, undue burden is the end result of weighing
this increased difficulty against the state interest protected. If increased diflicu ty is
justified by state interests, the burden is due; if increased difficulty is not justified by
state interests, the burden is undue. See note 23 infra. For the purpose of analysis,
this Note uses the word burden to mean the increased difficulty a woman encounters
in exercising her abortion right because of state regulation.
20. The cases do not define exactly the various degrees of burden, except to label
some burdens due, and some undue. See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
21. State interests are not precisely divided in terms of strength, though cases do
discuss compelling or significant interests. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 693-94 (1977) (significant); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75
(1976) (same); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 163 (1973) (compelling); Wynn v.
Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1384, 1385 (7th Cir. 1978) (significant). A compelling state
interest will justify even an undue burden of a fundamental right. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (right to abort); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)
(right to travel); Sherbert v. Vemer' 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (freedom of religion);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate). A significant state
interest justifies restriction of a minor's privacy rights. See Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75
(1976); Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1384-85 (7th Cir. 1978). Therefore, a parental
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burden imposed must be weighed against the interest protected to
determine whether the statute is a permissible restriction.13 This
notice statute could unduly burden the abortion right if justified by a compelling
state interest or simply burden the abortion right if justified by a significant state
interest. See note 23 infra (three-tier analysis as to burden).
22. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) required that state regulation be "'narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." Id. at 155. The problem
of overbreadth may also be analyzed in terms of a due process objection to an "Jr-
rebuttable presumption." See Malmed v. Thornburgh, 478 F. Supp. 998, 1013 n.8
(E.D. Pa. 1979). Irrebuttable presumptions violate due process by excluding certain
persons from a given right or privilege even though those persons merit coverage.
E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 641-48 (1974) (presumption
that pregnant school teachers are physically unable to continue teaching held to vio-
late due process clause); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446, 452 (1973) (presump-
tion that one was a nonresident for purposes of qualifying for reduced tuition rates for
residents at state university held to violate due process clause); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 654-58 (1972) (irrebuttable presumption that unwed fathers are not
competent fathers held to violate due process clause).
23. A woman's fundamental right to decide whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy cannot be unduly restricted by the state. This terminology is an ambiguous
compromise between two competing frameworks of analysis. The distinction between
the two frameworks seems largely semantic and largely irrelevant for the purpose of
identifying issues to analyze. "Undue burden" analysis focuses on whether the in-
creased difficulty of procuring an abortion is justified by state interests. If so, the
burden is due and the statute is valid; if not, the burden is undue and the statute is
invalid. Compare, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 649 (1979) (Bellotti II) (pa-
rental notice/judicial consent: undue burden) and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976) (third party consent: undue burden) and Wynn v. Carey,
582 F.2d 1375, 1387-90 (7th Cir. 1978) (parental notice/judicial consent: undue bur-
den) and Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 687-90, 695-97
(W.D. Mo. 1980) (judicial consent/ 48 hour waiting period/ parental notice: undue
burden) and Womens Servs., P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022, 1049-50 (D. Neb.
1979) (informed consent 48 hour waiting period: undue burden) and Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1201 (N.D. Ohio
1979) (parental consent/ parental notice: undue burden) with, e.g., Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67, 79-81 (1976) (informed consent/ recordkeeping:
acceptable burden) and Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1357-58 (8th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam) (recordkeeping: acceptable burden) and Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 694-95, 699-700 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (informed consent/
pathology reporting/ recordkeeping: acceptable burden) and Womens Servs., P.C. v.
Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022, 104749 (D. Neb. 1979) (disclosure of abortion alterna-
tives: acceptable burden) and Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of
Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1202, 1204-06 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (informed consent/ 24
hour waiting period/ recordkeeping/ reporting: acceptable burden) and H- L- v.
Matheson, 604 P.2d 907, 912 (Utah 1979) (parental notice: acceptable burden), prob.
juris. noted, 100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980).
"Three-tier" analysis analogizes the equal protection concept of intermediate re-
view of the right to an intermediate review of the burden. Compare Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 639-50 (1979) (Bellotti I) (intermediate review of burden) tcith Re-
gents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355-61 (1978) (plurality opinion) (in-
termediate review of right). Certain burdens that are not undue and that further
legitimate and important state interests merit some type of intermediate review. This
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Note argues that the typical parental notice statute is constitutional
because it places a minimal burden on the minor's abortion decision,
protects important state interests, and can be narrowly drawn to pro-
tect only those interests. This Note concludes with a Model Statute
which may be used as a guideline for avoiding the various constitu-
tional pitfalls inherent in requiring parental notice.
I. THE BURDEN: LIMITATIONS ON THE ABORTION DECISION
The first step in the constitutional analysis is to explore the burden
imposed by parental notice statutes. Courts closely examine restric-
tions placed on a minor's abortion decision because of the severe det-
riment suffered by a minor whose decision to abort is denied or sig-
nificantly impaired. 24 "Indeed, considering her probable education,
employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, un-
wanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a
minor." 25  The constitutional problem, however, arises when the
right to decide and effectuate her decision is impaired; if a woman
freely chooses to bear the child no constitutional right is implicated."0
A. Burdens on the Abortion Decision
Roe v. Wade and its progeny establish that certain state regulations
clearly pose an undue burden on a woman's abortion right. Criminal
sanctions, for example, cannot be imposed because they constitute an
tier analysis is implicit in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639-51 (1979) (Bellotti II);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-80 (1977) (equal protection analysis); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67 (1976); and Women's Community Health
Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 545-46 (D. Me. 1979). Under three-tier
analysis, a compelling state interest would justify an undue burden; a significant state
interest would justify a burden; and a rationally-related state interest would justify
statutes that impose no burden. Regardless of the approach, however, it is clear that
the burden imposed by a state statute must be weighed against the state interest
protected. E.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977) ("[T]he right in Roe v.
Wade can be understood only by considering both the woman's interest and the
nature of the State's interference with it."); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 61 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Whether the analysis is a
simple weighing, undue burden analysis, or a more fornalized weighing, three-tier
analysis, the issues to analyze are the same.
24. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1979) (Bellotti 11); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 680-86 (E.D.N.Y.),
rev'd sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
25. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (Bellotti II). This possible detri-
ment affects all pregnant women. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); J. Allen,
Managing Teenage Pregnancy ix (1980); F. Furstenberg, Unplanned Parenthood 1,
217 (1976); Kent, supra note 10, at 283-88.
26. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 94-95 (1976) (White, J., con-




absolute obstacle to the exercise of this fundamental right.27 Nor can
a state impose unreasonable regulations restricting the woman's ac-
cess to medical facilities or the physician's exercise of best medical
judgment.28  Similarly, the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth29 held that a state cannot delegate to a third party an "absolute,
and possibly arbitrary, veto" over the woman's abortion decision by
requiring prior written consent of the woman's parents or spouse.3 0
Whether it resides in the state or a third person, a state imposed veto
power is an undue burden. 31
Certain incidental burdens placed on the exercise of the abortion
right, however, are permissible. These include recordkeeping re-
quirements,3 2 waiting requirements, 3 informed consent require-
27. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973).
28. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192-99, 201 (1973).
29. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). For commentary discussing Danforth and its implications.
see Minor's Right of Privacy, supra note 8; Note, Parental Consent Abortion Stat-
utes: The Limits of State Power, 52 Ind. L.J. 837 (1977); Note, Third Party Consent
to Abortions Before and After Danforth: A Theoretical Analysis. 15 J. Fan. L. 508
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Third Party Consent]; Statutes After Danforth. supra
note 8; Note, The Illinois Abortion Parental Consent Act of 1977: A Far Cry From
Permissible Consultation, 12 J. Mar. J. Prac. & Proc. 135 (1978); Comment, Abor-
tion: An Unresolved Issue-Are Parental Consent Statutes Unconstitutional?, 55
Neb. L. Rev. 256 (1976).
30. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (emphasis added);
see Pilpel & Zuckerman, Abortion and the Rights of Minors. 23 Case W.L. Rev. 779
(1972); Third Party Consent, supra note 29; Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion
and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 Va. L. Rev. 305 (1974). The Roe v.
Wade Court recognized that third party rights were involved when a woman aborted,
but declined to comment on statutes giving third parties some role in the decision.
410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973).
31. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69, 72-75 (1976); see Poe v.
Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 794-96 (5th Cir. 1975), affd sub nore. Gerstein v. Coe, 428
U.S. 901 (1976); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 636-37 (W.D. Ky. 1974),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976); Doe v. Rampton, 366
F. Supp. 189, 193 (D. Utah), vacated, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Pilpel & Zuckerman,
supra note 30, at 792-96, 804-05. The Danforth Court did not decide the constitu-
tionality of less restrictive state statutory schemes giving parents a limited role in the
abortion decision or providing for parental notice. 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976); see Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639-40 (1979) (Bellotti II); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132,
146-50 (1976) (Bellotti I).
32. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976); Hodgson v. Law-
son, 542 F.2d 1350, 1357 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Womens Servs., P.C. v.
Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022, 1044-45 (D. Neb. 1979); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 700 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1205 (N.D. Ohio 1979). But see
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 213-14 (E.D. La. 1980) (recordkeeping
requirement burdensome); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1327-28 (N.D. Ill.)
(same), appeals dismissed per curiam on procedural grounds sub nomn. Carey v.
Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), affd sub norn. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.
1979). See generally Note, Restrictions on Women's Right to Abortion: Informed
Consent, Spousal Consent, and Recordkeeping Provisions, 5 Women's Rights L. Rep.
35, 46-51 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Restrictions].
33. See note 11 supra.
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ments, 34 provisions requiring a licensed physician to perform the
abortion, 35 and state regulation of abortions and abortion facilities
conforming with regulation of other medical procedures and
facilities. 36  These state restrictions of abortion are permissible even
though a person may decide not to abort because of the restriction. 37
In between the clarity of extremes fall numerous other state im-
posed burdens. For instance, the plurality in Bellotti v. Baird (Bel-
lotti II), 38 indicated that a judicial consent provision is acceptable if it
34. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67 (1976); Wolfe v.
Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 526 (6th Cir. 1976); Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1202 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Women's
Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 548-50 (D. Me. 1979);
Doe v. Deschamps, 461 F. Supp. 682, 685-86 (D. Mont. 1976); Wynn v. Scott, 449
F. Supp. 1302, 1316-17 (N.D. Ill.), appeals dismissed per curiain on procedural
grounds sub nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'd sub nora. Wynn v.
Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979); Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997, 1006 (N.D.
Ill.), aff'd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978). See generally
Restrictions, supra note 32, at 35-41.
35. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975) (per curiam); Hodgson v. Law-
son, 542 F.2d 1350, 1357 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 684-85 (W.D. Mo. 1980): Westchester Women's Health
Org. v. Whalen, 475 F. Supp. 734, 739 (S.D.N.Y. t979). These regulations, how-
ever, must be justified by medical needs, and not merely be a pretense for an undue
burden of the abortion right. Neither purpose nor effect can unduly restrict the abor-
tion decision. See Women's Medical Center of Providence, Inc. v. Cannon, 463 F.
Supp. 531, 537-38 (D.R.I. 1978) (because of the ease of certain abortion procedures a
state cannot require the performing physician to have hospital privileges).
36. Reasonable zoning ordinances applied to abortion facilities have been upheld.
Bossier City Medical Suite, Inc. v. City of Bossier City, 483 F. Supp. 633, 650
(W.D. La. 1980); West Side Women's Servs., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 450 F.
Supp. 796 (N.D. Ohio, affd mem., 582 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
983 (1978); see Note, Abortion Clinic Zoning: The Right to Procreative Freedom and
the Zoning Power, 5 Women's Rights L. Rep. 283 (1979) (review of zoning ordinances
restricting abortion clinics).
37. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977). Whalen involved a New York
statute requiring identification of patients taking certain dangerous drugs. Id. at
591-93. The Court recognized that "some individuals' concern for their own privacy
may lead them to avoid or to postpone needed medical attention," id. at 602, but
nevertheless upheld the statute as protecting a valid state interest. Id. at 603-04.
Whalen stands for the proposition that a minimal regulation that protects an impor-
tant state interest is usually permissible even though the regulation might lead some-
one to forego the exercise of a fundamental right. Id. at 602-03.
38. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist
joined Justice Powell in the plurality decision. These fbur Justices alone ruled on the
constitutionality of parental notice statutes and seemed to hold parental notice stat-
utes unconstitutional. Four Justices declined to rule on the issue and Justice White
dissented. Although not a plurality by definition, Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, Pow-
ell, and Chief Justice Burger will be referred to as a plurality for the sake of conve-
nience, and because later opinions use this designation. See generally 18 J. Fam. L.
403 (1980); 31 S.C.L. Rev. 604 (1980); 14 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 48 (1980). In Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), the Court remanded the decision of a three-
judge district court that held Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 112, § 12S (Michie/Law. Co-op
1980) (originally enacted as § 12P, here referred to as § 12S), unconstitutional. On
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enables a pregnant minor to obtain an abortion after establishing
either: (1) her maturity and ability to decide to abort without parental
consultation; or (2) that an abortion would be in her best interests. 39
The judicial consent proceeding also must be conducted expeditiously
and anonymously to avoid the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto"
proscribed in Danforth.40
Parental notice of these judicial proceedings, however, is constitu-
tionally impermissible.41 According to the plurality, a judicial con-
sent statute must allow every minor to go directly to a court without
first notifying or consulting her parents.42 The Court reasoned that,
in the judicial forum, the parents' superior resources and their posi-
tion of authority over their children give them the ability to impair
the minor's access to and probable success in court.4 3
B. The Burden Imposed by Parental Notice Statutes
Courts generally have found that parental notice statutes impose an
undue burden on minors because of the pressure and control parents
remand, the district court was to certify questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts to interpret § 12S. 428 U.S. at 151-52. Because § 12S could be con-
strued to avoid the constitutional question, the Supreme Court abstained from ruling
on its constitutionality. Id. at 146-47; see Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177-79
(1959) (hypothetical questions not appropriate for constitutional analysis). The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts answered these certified questions in Baird v.
Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 360 N.E.2d 288 (1977). The district court again
found the statute unconstitutional. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mass.
1978), affd, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); see 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 705 (1979). The district
court held that the statute imposed an undue burden and \w-as overbroad. 450 F.
Supp. at 1003-04.
39. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (Bellotti II). A judicial consent
statute requires the consent of a judge before a minor may obtain an abortion. Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 112, § 12S (MichielLaw. Co-op 1980) (held unconstitutional in Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (Bellotti II)) required that the minor first attempt
to obtain parental consent. If parental consent was denied, the minor could obtain
judicial consent. This statutory scheme required parental notice in every instance.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 646-48, 651 (1979) (Bellotti II); see I11. Ann. Stat. ch.
38, § 81-54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981) (held unconstitutional in Wynn v. Care%,
582 F.2d 1375, 1388-90 (7th Cir. 1978)).
40. 443 U.S. at 643-44; see note 11 supra (time is of the essence in abortion
cases).
41. 443 U.S. at 647-49. Massachusetts has amended § 12S to require parental
consent or judicial consent. Now the statute does not require or result in parental
notice. 1980 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 48 (to be codified at Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 112,
§ 12S). The First Circuit has delayed the effective date of the statute. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 14, 1980, § 1, at 15, col. 1.
42. 443 U.S. at 647-48, 651.
43. Id. at 647-49; see Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375. 1390 (7th Cir. 1978).
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may exert over their pregnant daughters.44 This analysis is too
simplistic; examining the burden imposed by parental notice statutes,
through a comparison with other burdens, is necessary. Bellotti II
does not control this issue despite the plurality's language to the con-
trary.45  The four concurring justices in Bellotti 1 14 held that the
44. Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1388 n.24 (7th Cir. 1978); Margaret S. v.
Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 203-05 (E.D. La. 1980); Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1202 (N.D: Ohio 1979); Women's
Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 547-48 (D. Me. 1979).
Some courts have found undue burden for reasons peculiar to the state statutory
scheme. See Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d at 1388-89; Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997,
1004-05 (N.D. II.) (holding unconstitutional I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 81-54 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1980-1981)), appeals dismissed per curiam on procedural grounds sub
nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), affd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d
193 (7th Cir. 1979). Section 81-54 requires judicial consent and parental notice,
which is more burdensome than simple parental notice. See Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 688 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (holding unconstitutional
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1980)). Section 188.028 is also a judicial
consent and parental notice statute. In Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F.
Supp. 679, 697 (W.D. Mo. 1980), the district court held Mo. Ann. Stat. § 188.039
(Vernon Supp. 1980) unconstitutional. The statute required simple parental notice
but was deemed an undue burden because it made no provision for constructive
notice to parents who could not be located, and failed to distinguish between eman-
cipated and unemancipated minors. In some cases it is not at all clear that undue
burden was present or even sought. Leigh v. Olson. No. A3-79-78, slip op. at 5
(D.N.D. July 9, 1979). In addition, the Leigh court failed to consider parental rights
as a state interest and suggested that parental rights lacked constitutional status. See
id. In H- L- v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1979), prob. juris. noted, 100 S.
Ct. 1077 (1980), the Supreme Court of Utah unanimously concluded that the Utah
parental notice statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304(2) (1978) ("To enable the physi-
cian to exercise his best medical judgment, he shall . . . [niotify, if possible, the
parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, if she
is a minor or the husband of the woman, if she is married."), was neither a veto of
nor an undue burden on the abortion right, and found the statute constitutional. 604
P.2d at 912-13. The court found that "'the statute does not per se impose any restric-
tion on the minor as to her decision to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 912; Cf.
Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529, 538-40 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (Florida's spousal
consent provision, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 458.505(4)(b) (West 1979), held an undue bur-
den). Utah § 76-7-304(2) (1978) also requires notice to the spouse of a married wo-
man. The Utah spousal notice provision was not at issue in H- L- v. Matheson,
604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1979), prob. juris. noted, 100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980).
45. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (Bellotti II). "We conclude,
therefore, that under state regulation such as that undertaken by Massachusetts,
every minor must have the opportunity-if she so desires-to go directly to a court
without first consulting or notifying her parents." Id. at 647; see Parent, Child, supra
note 9, at 1906. Justice Rehnquist voted with the plurality only to provide a consis-
tent standard of review and avoid a "fragmented holdin ." 443 U.S. at 652
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist referred to his partial dissent in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 92 (1976) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), to indicate his disagreement with the Bellotti II result
and his support of parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision. 443 U.S. at
652 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see note 38 supra and accompanying text.
46. Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in the judg-
ment in Bellotti II. 443 U.S. at 652.
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Massachusetts statute provided an absolute parental or judicial veto in
violation of Danforth, and pointedly reserved judgment on the con-
stitutionality of parental notice statutes. 47 They felt that the plural-
ity, in discussing parental notice statutes, had ,'address[ed] the con-
stitutionality of an abortion statute that Massachusetts ha[d] not
enacted," 48 and therefore had issued an advisory opinion. 49  The
conclusion of the concurrers and of three later courts is that neither
Danforth nor Bellotti II would require a finding of undue burden in
reviewing a parental notice statute.50
Furthermore, the Bellotti II plurality's objections to parental notice
are in the context of a statute different from the usual parental notice
statute. 51 The Massachusetts legislative scheme, invalidated in Bel-
lotti II, required parental consent or judicial consent and parental
notice, which is more burdensome than requiring simple parental
notice or providing a choice between parental notice and judicial con-
sent. 52 The plurality, moreover, would approve a qualified judicial
consent requirement if consent were mandatory when the minor has
the capacity to decide or when the abortion would be in her best
interests.5 3 Parental notice would seem less onerous than this type
of judicial consent.54
47. Id. at 652-56 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
48. Id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
49. Id. at 654 n.1, 656 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Advisory
opinions are contrary to well-founded, self-imposed judicial restraint and violate the
..case and controversy" requirement of U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 735 (1978); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126
(1945).
50. 443 U.S. at 654 n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), Doe v. Irwin,
615 F.2d 1162, 1167 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 7,
1980) (No. 79-1811); H- L- v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907, 912 (Utah 1979), prob.
juris. noted, 100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980); see Vomen's Community Health Center, Inc. v.
Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 547 (D. Me. 1979): 31 S.C.L. Rev. 604, 616 (1980). note
49 supra and accompanying text.
51. The Bellotti II plurality might have allowed parental notice in a statutory
scheme that did not require judicial consent. 443 U.S. at 647-48, 651; see notes 44-45
supra and accompanying text.
52. 443 U.S. at 644-48. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 81-54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-
1981) similarly requires notice to the parents of a minor seeking judicial authorization
for an abortion when parental consent is "'refused or cannot be obtained." This stat-
ute was held unconstitutional in Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1390 (7th Cir.
1978). Section 1 of the Model Parental Notice Statute in the Appendix does not
require parental notice prior to a judicial determination. See Burt, The Constitution
of the Family, 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 329, 337, 394; note 51 supra.
53. 443 U.S. at 647-51.
54. H- L- v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907, 912 (Utah 1979), prob. juris. noted.
100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980). Statutes that require parental notice prior to judicial consent
would create more of a burden on the minor's abortion right. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
38, § 81-54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981) (parental notice of judicial proceeding)
(held unconstitutional in Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1388-90 (7th Cir. 1978));
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Parental notice statutes encourage, but do not require, consulta-
tion.55 Even when parents are consulted, the advice received is only
one factor the minor would consider. 56 Although parents may object
to an abortion, parental notice statutes provide no veto power; the
minor retains the right to obtain an abortion regardless of parental
reaction. 57 The only right impinged is the minor's right to an abor-
tion without her parent's knowledge, 58 not the fundamental right to
decide to abort. 59
All restrictions characterized as undue burdens placed either a sig-
nificant obstacle in the way of the woman's exercise of her abortion
Mass. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12S (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1980) (effective parental
notice of judicial proceeding) (held unconstitutional in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 651 (1979)); Brief for Appellees at 5-7, H- L- v. Matheson, No. 79-5903
(U.S., filed Feb. 25, 1980); Burt, supra note 52, at 394 (arguing that a judicial con-
sent statute is more burdensome than a parental notice statute); notes 53-54 supra
and accompanying text.
55. A provision requiring notice 24 hours prior to the abortion would be a mini-
mal burden that would enable, but not require, the minor to consult with her par-
ents. See note 11 supra and accompanying text,
56. See note 37 supra and accompanying text. The approval of judicial consent in
Bellotti II indicates that some third party involvement in a minor's abortion decision
is beneficial and constitutional. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1979)
(Bellotti II); Brief for Appellees at 26, H- L- v. Matheson, No. 79-5903 (U.S.,
filed Feb. 25, 1980). Statutes requiring only parental notice do not constitute the
absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto proscribed in Danforth. See notes 31, 40, 41,
44 supra and accompanying text; § 3 of the Model Parental Notice Statute in the
Appendix.
57. H- L- v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907, 912 (Utah 1979), prob. juris. noted,
100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980); see note 37 supra. Parental notice statutes, see note 9 supra,
are intended and structured to notify the minor's parents and encourage consultation
between daughter and parents. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
58. A pregnant minor remains free to obtain an abortion after notice to her par-
ents. See notes 37, 56 supra and accompanying text. In addition, a statute such as
the Model Parental Notice Statute in the Appendix, does not impinge the minor's
right to a secret abortion because it provides an option, parental notice or judicial
consent. See §§ 1, 3 of the Model Parental Notice Statute in the Appendix. Confi-
dentiality is an element of the privacy right. See notes 4, 40-41 supra and accom-
panying text. The requirement of the Bellotti II plurality, "completed with anonym-
ity," 443 U.S. at 644, however, refers to the Massachusetts statute that coupled
parental consent with judicial consent. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text. A
statute with a notice requirement alone, or with a judicial consent option to a notice
requirement, would not violate this requirement. See Burt, supra note 52, at 337,
394. Parental notice would be a minimal privacy intrusion imposed only to vindicate
significant state interests. H- L- v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907, 912 (Utah 1979),
prob. juris. noted, 100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980). Minors would still be entitled to anonym-
ity from the general public and to confidential treatment of records. Further, even
adults do not enjoy the absolute right to a totally secret abortion in light of rec-
ordkeeping requirements. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 2, 3, [9-23, 26 supra and accompanying text.
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right or on the physician's exercise of best medical judgment. 0 Par-
ental notice statutes, on the other hand, place only a minimal burden
on the minor's abortion right, and no burden on the doctor's exercise
of best medical judgment. To determine the constitutionality of pa-
rental notice statutes, therefore, this minimal burden must be
weighed against the state interests protected.61
II. FURTHERING STATE INTERESTS
A. State Interests Defined
Roe v. Wade began the process of defining valid state interests.
The two compelling state interests identified in Roe v. Wade were
protection of the pregnant woman's health and of the potential life
represented by the fetus. 62 The state's interest in protecting mater-
nal health was "compelling" at the end of the first trimester, ca while
the state's interest in protecting potential life became "compelling" at
viability. c4 In addition, courts have found that various first trimester
regulations that impose minimal burdens on the abortion right are
60. Recordkeeping, informed consent provisions, and zoning ordinances have
been consistently upheld, as have provisions requiring that abortions be performed
by a licensed physician. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text. Post-Roe c.
Wade provisions that have been overturned include spousal consent requirements.
parental consent requirements, and parental or judicial consent provisions. See notes
30, 31, 39-41 supra and accompanying text. Restrictions on the exercise of the physi-
cian's best medical judgment have been invalidated. See note 28 supra and accom-
panying text; notes 101-02 infra and accompanying text.
61. For an examination of the standards of review in analyzing abortion regula-
tion, see notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
62. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) ("safeguarding health [and] maintaining medical
standards"); id. ("protecting potential life"); see note 7 supra and accompanying text.
63. 410 U.S. at 163. The Court based this conclusion on the medical fact that first
trimester mortality is less than mortality in normal childbirth. Id.
64. Id. The state interest in protecting potential life is compelling at viability
because the fetus is capable of life outside the womb. State regulation protecting the
fetus after viability is therefore legally and biologically justified. hd.; see Zbaraz v.
Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212, 1219 (N.D. I11. 1979) (state has no interest in protecting a
non-viable fetus if the woman medically needs an abortion), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694 (1980); Gorby, The "'Right" to an
Abortion, the Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment "Personhood," and the Supreme
Court's Birth Requirement, 1979 S. Ill. U.L.J. 1, 34-36; Note, The Juridical Status of
the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1647
(1979). In resolving the conflict between the abortion right and the state's interest in
protecting potential life, one court has concluded that regardless of the stage of preg-
nancy, a state has no legitimate interest in protecting fetal life when a woman needs
an abortion to protect her life or health. Reproductive Health Servs. v. Freeman, 614
F.2d 585, 598 (8th Cir. 1980).
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justified because they protect valid state interests.6 5 Similarly, par-
ental notice statutes impose minimal burdens and further interre-
lated 66 state interests. In the terms of the Bellotti II plurality, a state
can restrict a minor's constitutional and statutory rights 67 because of
the minor's vulnerability, the minor's inability to decide, and the
countervailing interests of parents. 68
1. Compensating for a Minor's Incapacity:
Furthering Informed Consent
The law has long recognized that minors lack capacity. At common
law, for example, minors were legally unable to act for themselves. 0
Today this legal concept is reflected in many restrictions of minors'
rights that further the significant state interest 70 of compensating for
the minor's incapacity. 71 Minors may not contract freely, 72 marry
65. See notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text. Recordkeeping requirements,
informed consent requirements, licensing qualifications, zoning ordinances, and cer-
tain judicial consent requirements have been upheld as protecting valid state in-
terests. See notes 6, 32-36 supra and accompanying text. These abortion regulations
further several state interests, such as protection of maternal health and protection of
fetal life. See notes 8, 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
66. The state interests of insuring informed consent and protecting parental rights
are intertwined but are separately treated for analytical purposes.
67. See notes 69-85 infra and accompanying text. Minors' rights are usually de-
cided on a case-by-case basis. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692
(1977) ("perhaps not susceptible of precise answer"); see, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967); Poe v. Gerstein, 517
F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd sub nor. Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976);
Parent, Child, supra note 9, at 1872.
68. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (Bellotti II).
69. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd sub nora. Gerstein
v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976); see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967); Bonner v.
Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Sup.
Ct. Pa. 1839); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 181-83 (G. Chase ed. 1878); Pilpel &
Zuckerman, supra note 30, at 779; Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's
Courts, 48 A.B.A.J. 719, 720 (1962).
70. Bellotti v. Baird. 443 U.S. 622, 635-36 (1979) (Bellotti II); Wynn v. Carey,
582 F.2d 1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1978).
71. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428. U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650
(1968) (Stewart, J., concurring); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts §§
8-1, 8-4, at 230, 235 (2d ed. 1977); W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts §§ 18,
134, at 102, 996-99 (4th ed. 1971); Parent, Child, supra note 9, at 1871-72.
72. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 34, 35 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); Mont. Rev, Codes
Ann. §§ 64-106, 64-107 (1970); N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law §§ 3-101, 3-105, 3-107
(McKinney 1978); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 53-2-1, 53-2-2 (1967); see J. Calamari &
J. Perillo, supra note 71, §§ 8-1, 8-4, at 230, 235.
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without parental consent, 73 vote, 74 or work where and when they
please. 75
After initial doubts as to the extent of minors' constitutional
rights, 76 the Court in In re Gault 77 indicated that minors are enti-
tled to procedural due process. 78 Later decisions extended constitu-
tional protection to other areas,79 including the right to privacy.8 0
The constitutional rights of minors, however, clearly are not co-
73. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4101, 4201 (West Supp. 1980); II1. Ann. Stat. clh. 40,§9 203, 204, 208 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 15, 15a
(McKinney 1977); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 48-306, 48-308 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 25-1-9, 25-1-11, 25-1-13 (1976).
74. E.g., Cal. Const. art. 2, § 1; Cal. Elec. Code § 17 (West 1977; Ill. Const.
art. 3, § 1; Mont. Const. art. IV, § 2; N.Y. Elec. Law § 5-102 (McKinney 1978); S.D.
Const. art. VII, § 2, S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 12-3-1 (1975); see Hill v. Stone, 421
U.S. 289, 295 (1975) (constitutional standard of right to vote); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969) (state has power to impose reasonable age
restriction on right to vote); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (minors may
be denied the right to vote).
75. Child labor laws are designed to protect minors from injury and exploitation
in the work place. E.g., Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1290, 1292-1294 (West 1971); II1. Ann.
Stat. ch. 48, §§ 31.1-31.3, 31.7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. §§ 10-201, 10-206 (1968); N.Y. Labor Law §§ 130-133 (McKinney Supp. 1979);
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 60-5-14, 60-12-2 to 60-12-4 (1978). See generally Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944).
76. See Rule v. Geddes, 23 App. D.C. 31, 50 (1904); Developments, supra note
4, at 1358.
77. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
78. Id. at 31-57 (minors and their parents entitled to adequate written notice of
specific issues involved; child and parents must be advised of their right to be rep-
resented by counsel; privilege against self-incrimination attaches; minor entitled to
right to confront adverse witnesses). Justice Fortas wrote that "'neither the Four-
teenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." Id. at 13.
79. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court held that the prosecution
must establish the guilt of minors beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency
proceedings. Id. at 367-68. The Court in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529-30, 541
(1975), applied the double jeopardy, clause to minors. Students are entitled to due
process before being suspended from public school. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
572, 576 (1975). Although public school students have a fourteenth amendment lib-
erty right to be free from physical punishment without due process, Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977), minors can only seek a remedy under the available
civil and criminal law. Id. at 678. Moreover, minors are not entitled to trial by jury
in juvenile delinquency proceedings. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
545-51 (1971).
80. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (minor's right of
privacy includes freedom to make procreation decisions); Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 73, 91 (1976) (minor's right to abortion without parental consent).
The Danforth Court concluded that "'[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors,
as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
Id. at 74 (citations omitted); see Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1383-84 (7th Cir.
1978).
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extensive with those of adults. 8 ' The Constitution itself recognizes
attainment of a certain age as a prerequisite to the exercise of some
rights.8 2  A minor's first amendment rights may be abridged or lim-
ited in ways not permissible if the rights of adults were involved.8
Restrictions on the right to marry and vote, permissible as to minors,
would be unconstitutional if applied to adults.84  Finally, the degree
of permissible state regulation of a minor's privacy rights is consider-
ably broader than its power over the privacy rights of an adult.8 5
Parental notice statutes recognize a minor's frequent lack of capacity
and attempt to insure that a minor's abortion decision be informed
and rational.8 6
81. E.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-39 (1979) (Bellotti II); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1971); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
638-39 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167-68 (1944); see T. Emerson,
The System of Freedom of Expression 496-97 (1970); cf, Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 600-04 (1979) (parental control is preferable to state control).
82. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (age of 25 to be member of House of Represen-
tatives); U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (age of 30 to be Senator); U.S. Const. art. II, §
1, cl. 5 (age of 35 to be President); see U.S. Const. amend. XXVI, § 1 (right to vote
afforded those 18 or older).
83. Compare Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-40, 645 (1968) (cannot
sell to minors certain obscene materials which can be sold to adults) with Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-14 (1969)
(minor's first amendment right to wear black armbands to protest Vietnam War can-
not be arbitrarily abridged). The Tinker Court emphasized that minors' first amend-
ment rights may not be arbitrarily restricted. Id. at 505-07; see Rowan v. Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 7,41 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
84. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); see Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 692-93 n.15 (1977) (Brennan, J.) ("The question of the extent of state power to
regulate conduct of minors not constitutionally regulable when committed by adults
is a vexing one, perhaps not susceptible of precise answer." Id. at 692.); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976); Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375,
1384 (7th Cir. 1978); Minor's Right of Privacy, supra note 8, at 1232.
85. The state need only show a "significant state interest" to restrict a minor's
privacy rights rather than the "compelling state interest" required in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). See notes 6, 21, 84 supra and accompanying text.
86. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1979) (Bellotti II); Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976); id. at 91 (Stewart, J., concurring) (state
furthers a constitutionally permissible interest by encouraging parental consultation
with a pregnant minor deciding whether to abort); Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375,
1385 (7th Cir. 1978); H- L- v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah 1979), prob.
juris. noted, 100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), indicated
that the abortion right involved the right of a woman to decide to abort. Id. at
153-54, 164. The right to decide requires capacity, even in the context of abortion.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 94-95 (1976) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968)
(Stewart, J., concurring in result); notes 68-85 supra and accompanying text. The
importance of an informed and intelligent decision to abort is further indicated by
decisions upholding informed consent requirements. See note 34 supra and accom-
panying text. See generally Minor's Right of Privacy, supra note 8, at 1222-23.
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Because many minors lack the capacity to make intelligent, in-
formed decisions,8 7 the minor may not be able to give effective con-
sent.88 The right to decide presupposes capacity to decide,8 9 and
absent capacity, the right to decide is meaningless, and perhaps
harmful.90 The requirement of informed consent in minors' abortions
flows from, and is analogous to, the common law rule requiring par-
ental consent before unemancipated minors receive non-emergency
medical care. 91  Informed consent and intelligent decision-naking is
essential when a pregnant minor is faced with the abortion deci-
87. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635-36 (1979) (Bellotti II); see Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976).
88. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635-36 (1979) (Bellotti II). The traditional age
of consent to medical procedures is usually 16, though often 17 and older. Parent,
Child, supra note 9, at 1910 n.258; see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 74-75 (1976); notes 91-98 infra. Bellotti I and Bellotti II also recognized that not
all minors would be capable of giving informed consent to an abortion. Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635-36 (1979) (Bellotti II); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147
(1976) (Bellotti I). See generally 31 Rec. A. Bar City N.Y. 694 (1976) (medical treat-
ment of minors under New York law).
89. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring
in the result) ("I think a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some
precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not pos-
sessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First
Amendment guarantees." (footnote omitted)); see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
635-36 (1979) (Bellotti II); Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1978).
90. For instance, an immature minor allowed to contract freely or arr" at will
could easily find herself making decisions beyond her capacity. See Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102-03 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Most limitations on minors are protective. Child labor laws pro-
tect minors from injury and exploitation in the workplace. See note 75 supra and
accompanying text. Contract law provides minors with the defense of disaffirmance to
enable them to escape from certain contracts. See notes 72 supra and accompanying
text.
91. J. Noonan, supra note 2, at 92; W. Prosser, supra note 71, § 18 (4th ed.
1971); see, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Jackovach v.
Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 924-25, 237 N.W. 444, 449 (1931); Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich.
1, 9-10, 260 N.W. 99, 102-03 (1935); Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 104-05, 61 P.2d
1018, 1019-20 (1936); Moss v. Rishworth, 222 S.W. 225, 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 19"20).
But see Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 884, 484 P.2d 1345, 1353, 95 Cal. Rptr.
1, 9 (1971) (en banc) (minor may obtain therapeutic abortion without parental con-
sent; pre-Roe v. Wade). See generally Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir.
1943), aff'd, 145 F.2d 492, 493 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 857 (1945);
Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474, 475-76 (Ky. 1952). Franklyn v. Peabody, 249
Mich. 363, 366-68, 228 N.W. 681, 682-83 (1930); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y.
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93-94 (1914), orerruled on other
grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 665, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 3, 10
(1957); Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 575-76, 137 P. 96. 97-98 (1913); Crannum v.
Berard, 70 Wash. 2d 304, 306-07, 422 P.2d 812, 814 (1967).
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sion. 92  Youth and the incapacity it implies is unquestionably a con-
cern. 93  Clinics provide abortions to girls not yet teenagers. 94  A
pregnant minor is likely to be confused and frightened. 95 Unfortu-
nately, absent parental consultation following parental notice, the
pregnant minor is not likely to encounter concerned advice. Abortion
clinics are unlikely to discourage the minor's decision to abort or in
other ways act contrary to their financial interest.96 The patient-
doctor conference and decision-making process articulated in Roe v.
Wade 97 is regrettably no more than an ideal. The reality is often a
short group counselling session conducted by nonphysicians in an un-
familiar and anxiety-ridden environment. 98 Parental notice statutes
would lessen the impersonal nature of this system.
92. The Supreme Court has recognized the difficulties minors face when con-
fronted with medical care decisions. "Most children, even in adolescence, simply are
not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need
for medical care or treatment." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). The impor-
tance of capacity to decide in the abortion context has been established. Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1979) (Bellotti II); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 67, 75 (1976). For instance, Danforth upheld the requirement of the wo-
man's written consent while invalidating third-party consent requirements. Id. at
65-67.
93. Chernesky, Abortion Patients and Abortion Counseling Today in Counseling
in Abortion Services 45-46 (1973).
94. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp.
1172, 1181 (N.D. Ohio 1979); see notes 92-93 supra and accompanying text; notes
95-96 infra and accompanying text.
95. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). "The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and
it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences." Id. at 67 (opinion of the court).
96. Proposed Constitutional Amendments: Hearing on S.J. Res. 119 and S.J. Res.
130 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comz1. on the
Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 468-72 (1974) [hereinafter cited as tlearingJ;
Wood & Durham, Counseling, Consulting and Consent: Abortion and the
Doctor-Patient Relationship, 1978 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 783, 784; Parent, Child, supra
note 9, at 1905 n.241 ("Abortion clinics do not profit by decisions not to abort, so
little incentive exists for discouraging abortions."); see Bus. Week, Dec. 10, 1979, at
68-73 (efforts of abortion clinic owners to diversify "helps them turn a tidy profit and
protects thenm against financial disaster"). For a description of the operation of a typi-
cal abortion clinic, see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 n.2 (1976)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
97. 410 U.S. 113, 153, 164 (1973).
98. Bellotti v. Baird. 443 U.S. 622, 641 n.21 (1979) (Bellotti II); Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 n.2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring); see Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1181-82
(N.D. Ohio 1979); Hearing, supra note 96, at 468-69 (patient-doctor relationship




A corollary informed consent interest furthered by the notice stat-
utes is better informed decision-making by the doctor. 98 A physician
who is provided with information about a patient's *'physical, emo-
tional, psychological, [and] familial" well-being, as well as her age,
would have a better basis for a medical judgment. 100  Roe v. Wade
and the cases following it have emphasized that the abortion decision
is to be made by the pregnant woman and her physician.' 01 Later
cases have invalidated restrictions that limit the exercise of the physi-
cian's best medical judgment. 10 2 Notifying the minor's parents would
further this interest by giving the physician access to information con-
cerning the minor's capacity to decide, best interests, and medical
history.103
2. Protecting Parental Rights
The second significant state interest furthered by parental notice
statutes is the preservation and protection of parental authority over a
child's development. 1 '0 The extent of parental rights, and the cor-
responding power of states to protect those rights, however, is
99. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304
(1978). Parental authorit
, 
includes a ' high duty to recognize symptoms of illnesses
and to seek and follow medical advice." 442 U.S. at 602.
100. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
101. Id. at 198-99; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 164 (1973).
102. In Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117-18 (1976), the Court recognized that
physicians had standing to assert the constitutional rights of women patients against
unconstitutional regulation of the abortion right. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 383 n.3 (1979). Statutes burdening the physician's exercise of best medical
judgment have been held constitutional. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 83-84 (1976) (Missouri statute set standard of care requiring physician to preserve
life of fetus). Danforth upheld Missouri's definition of viability because it was flexible
enough to allow the physician to determine "'whether a particular fetus is viable." Id.
at 64. "State regulation that impinges upon [the physician's] determination [of via-
bility], if it is to be constitutional, must allow the attending physician 'the room he
needs to make his best medical judgment.' " Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397
(1979) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)).
103. Most parents would be in an excellent position to provide the doctor with
valuable information concerning the minor's illnesses, allergies, and possible adverse
reactions to anesthetics. H- L- v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907, 912 (Utah 1979),
prob. juris. noted, 100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980); see notes 99-100 supra.
104. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1979) (Bellotti II); Wynn v. Carey,
582 F.2d 1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1978). This constitutional right of parents to raise,
educate, and guide their children does not affirmatively require the state to provide
notice but rather is a valid and significant state interest that the state may protect
through appropriate legislation. Cf. Doe v. Irwin. 615 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir.
1980) (no constitutional obligation on state to provide parental notice of contracep-
tives provided minor children; whether state can require notice left undecided), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1811). Note, Parental Notifica-
tion as a Prerequisite for Minors' Access to Contraceptives: A Behavioral and Legal
Analysis, 13 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 196 (1979).
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evaluated on a case by case basis. 10 5 Thus, it is appropriate to
analyze parents' rights when their children seek an abortion.
Parents have long been given extensive authority 106 to fulfill their
duties to protect, maintain, and educate their children. 10 7  These
rights first achieved constitutional status, in dicta, in Meyer v. Ne-
braska.10 8 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,10 9 the Court in fact pro-
tected parental rights when it held that Oregon could not require
parents or guardians to send their children to public school. 110 The
Court reasoned that the state requirement
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their con-
trol .... The child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations. 111
The Court has also upheld a parent's right to educate his child at
home despite a statute requiring compulsory public school atten-
dance. 112
105. The Supreme Court's recognition of parental rights has not determined the
issue of where to draw the line if and when the rights of minors and parents clash.
See Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U. Cal. D.L. Rev. 255
(1979). Few cases discuss this clash; conflict between the constitutional rights of par-
ents and their minor children is rare. Developments, supra note 4, at 1377-79,
106. 1 W. Blackstone, supra note 69, at 167. "He may lawfully correct his child,
being under age, in a reasonable manner; for this is for the benefit of his education.
The consent or concurrence of the parent to the marriage of his child under age ...
is [now] absolutely necessary . . . . And this also is another means, which the law has
put into the parent's hands, in order the better to discharge his duty . ld.
(emphasis in original).
107. Id. at 167. Parental authority over their children is recognized by American
common law. 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 188-233 (11th ed. 1867).
108. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Although Meyer protected a teacher's right to teach
German, the Court stated that the fourteenth amendment liberty rights included
"the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren, . . .and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. at 399 (citations omit-
ted); see Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
109. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
110. Id. at 534-35.
111. Id.
112. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972). The Yoder Court noted that
"'[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition." Id. at 232.
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The common law right to raise, guide, and educate children is now
firmly established as a fourteenth amendment liberty interest.113
Parents have the right to inculcate their children with "moral stan-
dards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship," without
conforming to state prescribed procedures."14 Parental rights are
consistent "with our tradition of individual liberty;" they are a basic
presupposition of that liberty."15
Parental authority, however, is limited; 116 it is to be neither tyran-
nical nor authoritarian. Redress for abuse of parental authority can be
achieved under child abuse laws, 117 and even traditional tort con-
113. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 & n.18 (1979) (Bellotti II); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602"-03 (1979); Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968): Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944). The parental rights cases discussed here, see notes 106-12 supra and
accompanying text, and in Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 639 n.18, did not decide the rights
of parents against the right of their minor children. Rather, in these cases the par-
ents and minors generally had similar interests. See Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375.
1385 n.18 (7th Cir. 1978); Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1975), affid
sub nom. Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629 (1968), the Court recognized that "constitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society." Id. at 639. Protect-
ing these parental rights is a significant state interest, Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d
1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1978), that warrants upholding parental notice statutes. See
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) C'Our jurisprudence historically has re-
flected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental au-
thority over minor children."); Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1167 (6th Cir. 1980).
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 79-1811); Hevman & Bar-
zelay, supra note 2, at 772 ("family has historically been a fundamental unit of our
society for such purposes as socialization and nurture"). The fact that the family ante-
dates the state and the traditional importance attached to the family has played an
important part in constitutional examination of the family and its members. Derelop-
ments, supra note 4, at 1117-78, 1352; see Rehnquist, WVe Are Family, Lawyers Stay
Away, Nat'l L.J., July 28, 1980, at 15, col. 1 ("the family is an institution of extraor-
dinary virtue-well worth preserving").
114. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
115. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979) (Bellotti II); Hafen, Children's
Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth
to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 605, 615-17.
116. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court upheld a state
statute prohibiting minors from selling newspapers and periodicals on the street not-
ing that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id. at 166 (citation omitted).
Despite these parental rights, however, the Court found state regulation appropriate.
Id. at 170.
117. States have statutes to protect against child abuse including deprivation of
custody. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 232, 232.1, 238 (West Supp. 1980); I11. Ann. Stat. ch.
23, § 2055, ch. 37, §§ 701-2, 703-1, 705-2, 705-7 (Smith-Hurd 1980-1981); Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 10-1309, 10-1310, 10-1311, 10-1314 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y.
Fain. Ct. Act (29A) §§ 611, 614, 631 (McKinney Supp. 1978): S.D. Comp. Laws Ann.
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cepts. 118  These limitations, however, are on the exercise of the
right; the appropriateness of the constitutional protection of that right
is undisputed. 119 A state cannot unduly restrict, but can choose to
protect these parental rights with parental notice statutes. 120 The
legitimacy of statutes and case law giving parents control over their
children, 121 the right to consent to medical care on behalf of their
children, 122 and the right to raise their children and inculcate them
with certain values 123 are well established 124 and indicate that paren-
tal rights are worthy of proteqtion absent "a powerful countervailing
interest." 125
§§ 26-8-19.1, 26-8-22.10, 26-8-23.1, 26-8-36 (Supp. 1979); Note, Termination of Pa-
rental Rights and the Lesser Restrictive Alternative Doctrine, 12 Tulsa L.J. 528
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Termination].
118. W. Prosser, supra note 71, § 122, at 864-67; see Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23
N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532 (1969) (abrogation of
defense of intrafamilial immunity).
119. Abuse of parental authority does not necessarily undermine parental author-
ity, but rather creates a need for review and termination in cases of abuse. Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979); see Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039,
1047-49 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 119 (1977).
120. See note 104 supra.
121. See notes 104-13 supra and accompanying text.
122. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941); note 91 supra and
accompanying text.
123. See notes 107-13 supra and accompanying text.
124. See Bellotti v. Baird, 442 U.S. 622, 637-38, 639 n.18 (1979) (Bellotti II); notes
113-15 supra and accompanying text.
125. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). One countervailing state interest
justifying interference in the parent-child relationship is protection of the child's life
and health. In Custody of a Minor, 78 Mass. Adv. Sb. 2002, 379 N.E. 2d 1053
(1978), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts removed a child from the legal
custody of parents who refused the child medical care. Chemotherapy would have
given the child a good chance to survive leukemia. Id. at 2036-37, 379 N.E.2d at
1066-67. Other ourts have ordered medical treatment for children over parental
objection. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 501-05
(W.D. Wash. 1967) (per curiam), affd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); People ex
rel. Wallace v. Labrenza, 411 Ill. 618, 625-26, 104 N.E.2d 769, 774, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 824 (1952); Custody of a Minor, 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2002, 2035-37, 379
N.E.2d 1053, 1066-67 (1978); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Mo. Ct. App.
1952); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 582-84, 279 A.2d
670, 673-74 (1971); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 477, 181 A.2d 751, 759-60, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128, 131, 263 N.Y.S. 552, 555-56
(2d Dep't 1933); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 89-90, 185 N.E.2d '128, 131-32 (Ct.
C.P. 1962); Heinemann's Appeal, 96 Pa. 112, 115 (1880); Mitchell v. Davis, 205
S.W.2d 812, 814-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs:
Justifications and Limitations, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1383, 1399-1401 (1974). Whether
medical care should be provided over parental objection depends on the minors
capacity to decide and chance of survival. See Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). In re Hofbauer, 47
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The fourteenth amendment liberty rights that parents have in rais-
ing and guiding their children find protection in parental notice stat-
utes. 126 These statutes vindicate parents' right to participate in their
child's abortion decision. 127 Some courts, however, have found pro-
tection of parental rights inadequate justification for parental notice
statutes because of the assumption that parents will oppose the
minor's abortion decision irrespective of the minor's best in-
terests.1 2 8  In essence, it is assumed that parental notice will not
compensate for a minor's incapacity, nor reinforce meaningful paren-
tal consultation. Implicit, if not presumed, in the common law and
constitutional protection afforded parental rights, however, is that
parental involvement will usually benefit the child. 129 In addition,
experience demonstrates that the vast majority of parents are suppor-
tive and will act in their daughter's best interests.' 30 Admittedly, in
an extreme case, the parents' reaction might compromise the minor's
best interests or lead the minor to forego an abortion solely on the
basis of parental opposition. 131 The minor, however, would be free
N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979). indicates that parents must
provide "an acceptable course of medical treatment for their child in light of all the
surrounding circumstances." Id. at 656, 393 N.E.2d at 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 941;
see J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Before the Best Interests of the Child 91-95
(1979); Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervision of Paren-
tal Autonomy, 86 Yale L.J. 645 (1977).
126. See notes 13, 104-14 supra and accompanying text. Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968), establishes the right of a state to protect minors. Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-36, 638-39 (1979) (Bellotti II); Wynn v. Carev, 582 F.2d
1375, 1385 (7th Cir. 1978). These cases indicate that certain parental rights cannot be
unduly restricted by the state. Although parental rights may clash with minor's
rights, this does not invalidate the case law establishing parental rights. Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979); see notes 116, 119 supra and accompanying text.
127. In Bellotti I, for example, the minor's parents were not notified of their
daughter's pregnancy and her abortion decision. The parents were thus unable to
consult with their daughter. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 862 (D.Mass. 1975)
(Julian, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti 1).
128. See Parent, Child, supra note 9, at 1878; note 14 supra; notes 129-30 infra
and accompanying text; cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-04 (1970) (mental
health institutionalization). Additionally, contrary to the fears of courts which have
struck down parental notice statutes that parents will universally force their children
to bear the child, there is evidence that many teenagers undergo abortions after
strong pressure to abort from their parents. See Parent, Child. supra note 9, at 1909
n. 257.
129. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979).
130. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 648-49 (Bellotti II); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976); Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1387-88 (7th Cir.
1978); Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp.
1172, 1202 (N.D. Ohio 1979). Furthermore, there is a presumption that parents will
act in their children's best interest. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979).
131. See note 14 supra.
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to disregard this arbitrary and perhaps illegal parental opposition,' 3 2
obtain an abortion, and seek the usual redress under child abuse or
child protection statutes. 133
B. Equal Protection: Overbreadth
State statutes regulating abortion, in addition to imposing only
burdens justified by state interests, must be "narrowly drawn" to re-
strict fundamental rights only by furthering valid state interests. 134 A
statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it significantly restricts the
rights of persons to whom the statute should not apply. 135 Arguably,
parental notice statutes are overbroad because they require notice to
parents of minors mature enough to give informed consent, 130 and
therefore, as to those minors, would not further significant state in-
terests.
To determine whether parental notice statutes are overbroad as to
mature minors, as with any analysis of abortion regulation, it is neces-
sary to examine the extent of the burden on the abortion right and
the nature of the state interests protected. 137 In effect, the over-
breadth analysis is whether parental notice statutes unduly restrict a
mature minor's abortion rights. The burden placed on the abortion
rights of mature minors is even less than the minimal burden placed
on the abortion rights of immature minors. Compared with an imma-
ture minor, a mature minor is in a better position to disregard arbi-
trary parental opposition because of her increased resources, educa-
tion, and maturity. 138 Moreover, significant state interests are still
132. H- L- v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907, 912-13 (Utah 1979), prob. juris. noted,
100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980); see note 37 supra and accompanying text.
133. See notes 140-41 supra and accompanying text. See generally Parham v. J.R,
442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979); Termination, supra note 117, at 529-34.
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). In Bellotti II, the
plurality expressly refused to examine the Massachusetts statute on equal protection
grounds. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650 n.30 (1979) (Bellotti II). In proposing an
acceptable parental notice/judicial consent statute, the plurality indicated that not all
minors' parents should be notified. Id. at 643-44, 647-48. Section 1 of the Model
Parental Notice Statute in the Appendix provides foi judicial consent without man-
datory parental notice.
135. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-25, at 712 (1978); see Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[T]he overbreadth of a statute must not only
be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep."). Although Broadrick is a first amendment case, it establishes the standard
for overbreadth. See L. Tribe, supra, § 12-25, at 712.
136. See note 15 supra.
137. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
138. Mature minors would be able to more easily disregard arbitrary parental op-
position. Less mature minors who lacked the capacity to grant informed consent
would be more susceptible to parental opposition, although they too could obtain an
abortion despite such opposition. See notes 132-33 supra and accompanying text.
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protected. Although, as a matter of definition, a mature minor is cap-
able of informed consent, certain other informed consent interests of
the mature minor are protected by parental notice statutes. Parental
consultation would enhance the quality of the mature minor's decision
in the majority of the cases, 139 and the physician would have access
to information from parents permitting better medical judgment.1 40
The second state interest, protecting parental rights, applies through-
out the child's minority.'141 Although parental rights to guide and
educate a mature minor may be less extensive than their rights as to
an immature minor, parents retain a right to participate in the impor-
tant decisions of their unmarried, unemancipated children. 142 Thus,
because the burden on a mature minor 143 is minimal and the state
139. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp.
1172, 1202 (N.D. Ohio 1979); see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) (Bellotti
II); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring);
WVynn v. Care', 582 F.2d 1375, 1388 (7th Cir. 1978); Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp.
997, 1012 nn.6-9 (D. Mass. 1978) (Julian, J., dissenting), aff'd. 443 U.S. 622 (1979)
(Bellotti II); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 567 tE.D.
Pa. 1975), aff'd sub nor. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); H- L- v.
Matheson, 604 P.2d 907, 912 (Utah 1979). prob. juris. noted, 100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980).
140. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
141. See notes 104-33 supra. At some point, however, parental authority ends.
Independence increases vith maturity.
142. Parental rights and parental authority arose because of minors' incapacity and
inability to provide and make decisions for themselves. As minors become more ma-
ture and capable, it would seem that parental authority over them diminishes.
143. The mature minor rule exempts from a parental consent requirement those
minors found to be mature enough to provide informed consent. The Restatement of
Torts contains an implicit mature minor exception. "If the child . . . is capable of
appreciating the nature, extent and consequences of the invasion, his assent prevents
the invasion from creating liability. Restatement of Torts § 59. Comment a
(1934); see W. Prosser, supra note 71, § 18, at 103; Restatement (Second) of Torts §
892A, Comment b (1979); id. § 59 (1965); Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care
Decision-Making Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 Va. L. Rev. 285,
289-90 (1976); Pilpel & Zuckerman, supra note 30, at 782-83; note 86 Yupra and
accompanying text. A good faith declaration by the minor's physician that the minor
is capable of giving informed consent would protect the rights of mature minors.
Moreover, the physician would remain subject to the traditional common law rem-
edies for battery if he performed an abortion on a minor found not capable of
giving consent. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 12-23 (D.C. Cir. 1941). The
mature minor exception is well established in cases of non-emergency medical treat-
ment. See, e.g., Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, 205 Kan. 29-2,
298-301, 469 P.2d 330, 336-38 (1970); Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 85, 211 N.WV.
75, 78 (1926); Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 155 Miss. 1, 9-10. 119 So. 501, 50"2
(1928); Lace- v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 14, 139 N.E.2d 25, 27 (1956); Bach v. Long
Island Jewish Hosp., 49 Misc. 2d 207. 208, 267 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290-91 (Sup. Ct.
1966); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 449-50, 279 N.Y.S. 575, 577 (City Ct.
1935); Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16, 20-21, 431 P.2d 719, 723 (1967). One court
has held that "[tihe mature minor rule calls for an analysis of the nature of the
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interests protected are significant, parental notice statutes should
apply with equal force to mature and immature minors. 144 A mature
minor should be treated differently, however, when she seeks judicial
consent. 145 If capable of informed consent, the decision to abort
should be hers alone, and judicial recognition of her capacity to de-
cide should be required. 146
CONCLUSION
Many strive to eliminate the abortion decision as a right; many
strive to assure that the right is not eroded. But whether termed
operation, its likely benefit, and the capacity of the particular minor to understand
fully what the medical procedure involves." Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass.
741, 752, 360 N.E.2d 288, 295 (1977).
144. There are two additional reasons why the mature minor exception should not
be read into parental notice statutes. First, incorporation of the mature minor excep-
tion might frustrate valid state interests, and would probably be contrary to legisla-
tive intent. None of the ten parental notice statutes makes a mature minor exception.
See note 19 supra. Notice under each statute is required if the pregnant woman has
not reached the age of consent. See Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 749-
55, 360 N.E.2d 288, 294-97 (1977) (court declined to incorporate mature minor ex-
ception into Massachusetts abortion statute). The second reason for utilizing the
somewhat arbitrary age classification of parental notice statutes, rather than incorpo-
ration of the mature minor exception, is to avoid an adversarial posture between
parents and child. "Though a child who is not fully mature in all respects may be
able to make mature decisions concerning certain activities, the parent-child relation-
ship cannot be separated by subject matter into component parts. Litigation over the
child's capacity to make the decision may endanger that relationship. . . . The
psychological costs of litigation may even justify recourse to arbitrary line drawing by
age, sacrificing the interests of the unusually precocious child at an age at which the
availability to his contemporaries of individualized inquiry would only serve as a
forum for immature aggression." Developments, supra note 4, at 1380 (footnotes
omitted); see Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on
the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 769 (1978); Hafen, supra note
115; Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications and Conclusive Presumptions: Three
Linked Riddles, 39 Law & Contemp. Prob. 8 (1975). See generally Wynn v. Carey,
582 F.2d 1375, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1978); Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (D.
Mass. 1978), affd, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II). In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979), the Court objected to an adversarial posture between parent and child. Id. at
610; Rehnquist, The Adversary Society: Keynote Address of the Third Annual Baron
de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 9 (1978). Furthermore, the
"law is incapable of effectively managing . . . so delicate and complex a relationship
as that between parent and child." J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the
Best Interests of the Child 8 (1979).
145. Bellotti II mandates that a state which requires minors to obtain judicial con-
sent to their abortion must not withhold consent from minors mature enough to
decide. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44, 647, 651 (1979) (Bellotti II).
146. See § 1 of the Model Parental Notice Statute in the Appendix which explicitly
incorporates the mature minor exception in judicial proceedings. Granting mature
minors judicial consent would satisfy constitutional requirements. Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 643-44, 647, 651 (1979) (Bellotti II).
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destruction of potential human life or protection of the integrity of a
woman's body, the experience of procuring an abortion is haunting.
This is especially true for the confused and inexperienced teenage
girls who now seek abortions. Parental notice statutes protect the
physical and mental health of these girls by enabling parents to help
their children through the pains of growthi. Surely the Constitution
does not require that teenage girls should face the abortion decision
alone. The welfare of these girs should not be compromised in the
wake of abortion debates.
APPENDIX
MODEL PARENTAL NOTICE STATUTE 147
§ 1. No abortion shall be performed on any unmarried, unemancipated
woman under the age of eighteen unless:
(a) her physician at least twenty-four, but not more than forty-eight, hours
before the abortion makes a good faith attempt to provide actual notice to at least
one of the minor's parents or guardians, or if actual notice is unsuccessful, her
physician must provide the minor's parents or guardians with twenty-four hours
constructive notice. 148 In deciding which parent or guardian to notifl. the
physician may consider the request of the minor; 149 or. 150
(b) the minor obtains judicial consent for the abortion from a judge of the
appropriate court. 15' Such consent must be granted ifi
147. This proposed parental notice statute is intended to serve as a guideline for
protecting parental rights and insuring informed consent within constitutional limita-
tions. Certain terms in the proposed statute are left undefined. The statute is pro-
posed only with the caveat that each state's laws %%ill have individual pro%isions. defini-
tions, and case lasw that will affect the statute in various was's. These intricacies are
not explored and consequently this Model Statute serves merely as a point of depar-
ture.
148. A 24 hour to 48 hour notice requirement will constitute a minimal burden on
the woman's abortion right but will be sufficient to allow consultation with her par-
ents. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
149. The physician should exercise best medical judgment in choosing the parent
to notify. Notice to a parent who is abusive. has had sexual relations with the minor,
or will arbitrarily oppose the minor's abortion decision can thus be avoided.
150. The Model Parental Notice Statute provides the minor with an alternative,
parental notice or judicial consent. The Model Statute thereby lessens the burden on
a minor unwilling to face her parents. Bellotti II indicated that certain judicild con-
sent statutes would be acceptable. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-50 (1979)
(Bellotti II). Consequently, the Model Statute would protect important state interests
without substantially burdening the minor's abortion right.
151. Jurisdiction for providing this judicial consent should probably reside in Famn-
ily Court rather than a court of general jurisdiction. Judges in Family Court are more
likely to be attuned to the needs of minors, and will be able to provide support
services less likely to be found in a court of general jurisdiction. Sc' N.Y. Fan. Ct.
Act (29A), §§ 251, 253 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1978). Additionall., Faunil% Court is
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(1) an abortion is found to be in the minor's best interests, or
(2) the minor is found to be emancipated or mature enough to
give informed consent to the abortion. 1 52
The judicial proceeding at which this consent is obtained must be held
within forty-eight hours of the minor's written request on a form
specified by the court. 153 The hearing, decision, and appeal, if any, are
to be conducted expeditiously and anonymously. 154  A minor who
obtains judicial consent to an abortion will not be bound by any other
waiting period required before an abortion may be obtained. No notice
of the judicial proceeding is to be provided to the minor's parents or
guardians. The judge may order notice of the minor's pregnancy and
state of health to a parent or guardian if the judge finds such notice to be
in the minor's best interests.' 5 5 A minor's parents or guardians will not
have standing nor be joined as parties to the judicial consent proceed-
ing. 156
§ 2. If a licensed physician certifies that delay caused by parental notice or
judicial consent required under § 1 would seriously endanger the physical
health or life of the minor, the physician may perform an abortion without
notice or consent as required under § 1. In such a case the physician must
provide actual or constructive notice of the abortion and the minor's health
to at least one of the minor's parents or guardians within forty-eight hours
after the abortion is completed. 157
more likely to have a flexible calendar, confidential treatment of records, and stream-
lined procedures. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act (29A), §§ 161-168 (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1978).
152. By explicitly incorporating a mature minor exception in a judicial consent
provision, a parental notice statute would satisfy the requirements of Bellotti 1I. Bel-
lotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (Bellotti II); see notes 144-46 supra an(l
accompanying text.
153. Time is of the essence in effectuation of a woman's abortion decision. Delay
raises both legal and medical problems. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
154. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (Bellotti II); notes 39-40 supra
and accompanying text.
155. The judge should be granted the discretion whether to notify the minor's
parents and/or the appropriate child welfare agencies in cases of incest. Granting this
discretion to the trial judge would avoid the possible undue burdens of a mandator),
notice provision, see notes 14, 39-44 supra and accompanying text, as well as further
the state interests of parental consultation and informed consent. This provision
would prevent unbridled use of the judicial consent option by minors solely to keep
the abortion secret from their parents.
156. By not allowing parents or guardians to become parties to the judicial pro-
ceeding at which their daughter seeks judicial consent, the statute avoids burdening
the minors' initial access to court and her chance of obtaining judicial consent. See
notes 39, 44, 52, 54 supra and accompanying text.
157. Notice to the parents after an abortion is performed would not burden the
abortion right in any, way. Furthermore, state interests would be protected because
notice would inform the parents of a significant, serious, and often traumatic event in
their daughter's life. This notice would better enable parents to guide and raise their
child. See notes 104-27 supra and accompanying text.
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§ 3. Nothing in this statute gives parents or guardians the right to deny an
abortion desired by an unmarried minor. 158
Patrick J. Foye
158. Section 3 is designed to prevent any possible misconstruction of this notice
statute to allow a parental veto in violation of Danforth. See notes 29-31 supra and
accompanying text.
